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Abstract— The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
remains an important requirement for many electronic services
which utilise user data. GDPR compliance verification for a cloud
provider is aimed to confirm that personal data provided by a
user is shared in-line with the requirements of this legislation, so
that any subsequent audit carried out on the provider does not
lead to a financial penalty. This verification involves two aspects:
(i) ensuring that user consent has been obtained; (ii) sharing of
data with external cloud providers is undertaken in a transparent
way, so that the user is aware of which providers the information
was shared with and for what purpose. Using a survey we
describe why users are still ambivalent about the use of GDPR –
and how its adoption can be improved using a Blockchain-based
architecture that can provide greater transparency on how GDPR
compliance is supported by cloud providers.
I. INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
Understanding the role of behavioural factors, such as
perceived performance and ease of use [1], [2] influences how
users adopt and utilise new software infrastructures. However,
embeddedness of internet-enabled devices in our daily lives,
and their integration in private and organisational routine,
have led to unprecedented changes in user perceptions and
behavioral patterns [3]. This is also particularly relevant in
the context of privacy-enhancing technologies that attempt to
limit exposure of personal user data.
The ubiquitous connectivity of people to the Internet have
emphasised concerns over the degree to which devices ensure
information privacy and security [4]. Perceived privacy is
an individual’s belief about how their personal information
is acquired, controlled, stored and used [4]. While several
researchers have empirically confirmed the direct effect of this
factor on user behaviour, others found that the effect is non-
significant [5]. This forms the key focus of this contribution
– i.e. to what extent do users consider the utility and benefit
of privacy-preserving technologies, including support provided
by legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). We motivate this work by two questions:
• Q1: how do users perceive benefit in using privacy
technologies to support GDPR legislation, particularly in
the context of cloud hosted services?
• Q2: is GDPR seen as a barrier to making more effective
use of cloud services, i.e. do users consider GDPR as
a barrier to more effective use of services from a cloud
provider, or as an important requirement that needs to
be fulfilled before initiating any interaction with a cloud
provider?
In the context of Q1, we also inquire if providing user consent
for cloud providers to use their personal data (Art. 6 of GDPR),
a key tenet of many articles within the GDPR legislation, is
fully understood by users.
In order to secure broad access to personal data under the
semblance of GDPR compliance, website owners are increas-
ingly relying on ‘dark patterns’ – i.e. interface designs which
seek to nudge users into desired privacy-intrusive choices
through deceitful interaction flows. Examples of GDPR-non-
compliant dark patterns are intrusive default settings, the
concealment of privacy-friendly choices, requiring extra effort
from users to choose them, and take-it-or-leave-it options
which bundle many data processing operations1. Empirical re-
search has shown that many dark patterns on the Web are com-
mon, even widespread, such that the provision of the service
on the basis of implicit consent (i.e. no consent asked) makes
the rejection of all tracking technologies substantially more
difficult than accepting them, with buried pre-ticked boxes
for optional vendors (e.g. third-party trackers) or purposes/
categories of data processing [6]. Similarly, some websites
relying on advertising as their main revenue source, coupled
with the complexity and multiplicity of actors involved in the
advertising actor chain, results in numerous instances where
data processing by specific entities is not duly informed, and
consequently users cannot possibly be aware of them.
In the ongoing pandemic, which has forced us to increase
our reliance on digital technologies to conduct our lives
and endure restrictions, the above mentioned practices are
exacerbated, making the notion of individual control all the
more illusory. For example, imagine you want to have a
meal in your local restaurant – upon entering the premises
you realise there is no ‘traditional’ customer service; rather,
you need to download a booking and payment app., entering
personal details to register. However, registration cannot be
completed — and therefore you cannot be served -– until you
tick a box signalling consent to terms and conditions that allow
for extensive processing of personal data based on several legal
basis, for multiple purposes unrelated to the transaction you
had in mind (i.e. having a simple meal). Any consent given as
a result is invalid under the GDPR, as the consent request
involved no real choice. Yet, without the competent Data
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Protection Authority (DPA) actually finding and penalising the
breach, consent obtained in this way is ‘fair game’2.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in
Section II we present GDPR requirements for cloud services,
especially where a number of interconnected cloud providers
need to work together. In Section II-A we describe how user
uptake of on-line services is impacted by concerns about
data privacy, an aspect that has been amplified during the
recent pandemic. Due to increasing requirements to work
from home (for a distributed work force), employees are often
required to make use of on-line service (and platforms) to work
from home. Privacy considerations are therefore overlooked to
ensure that a minimal level of work can continue from home.
Under this general context, GDPR considerations become
even more significant, as these provide protection for users
when sharing their personal data to access on-line services. In
Section II-B we describe our survey used to assess interest in
GDPR compliance verification, and to what extent users are
fully aware of how cloud providers manage GDPR compliance
verification for user provided data. We conclude our work in
Section V and offer our views on future work on how data
privacy legislation can be used more widely.
II. GDPR USE FOR CLOUD SERVICES
Even though online cloud service providers which host
services, such as Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure, try to
convince end-users (consumers) about their security and pri-
vacy strategies, there still exist a number of grey areas around
privacy legislation and adoption by cloud service providers.
Specifically, it is hard to convince users when a multi-
cloud service chain is involved where different cloud service
providers act as data controllers and data processors. In such
an environment, the liability of data leakage or unauthorized
access to personal data of a user can be conflicted. To enforce
liabilities and responsibilities for privacy, the GDPR legislation
ensures that organizations must observe specific rules based on
the following principles: lawfulness, fairness and transparency,
purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy/ consistency,
storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality (security), and
accountability. Any non-compliance of the GDPR legislation
associated with these aspects, e.g. leakage or non-reporting of
an unauthorized use of personal data, may lead to financial
consequences for cloud providers. For instance, the 2018
Cambridge Analytica scandal ended up in a financial penalty
of US$5B for Facebook3 for leakage of user profiles without
user consent.
In [7] an extensible layered privacy language (LPL) was
presented to formally express privacy policy, user consent and
retention management in GDPR. However, the implementation
of LPL in a real environment (e.g., cloud and IoT) was
not examined. Moreover, the data movement across different
data processors/ controllers was not taken into account in




LPL. A privacy preference language, called YaPPL, was
introduced in order to realize user consent requirements of
GDPR within an IoT ecosystem [8]. This work also aligns
with the focus of our efforts, however the verification of user
consent based on the purposes of data processing was not
undertaken in a transparent and automatic way in YaPPL.
Another recent extension to YaPPL focuses on the devel-
opment of a transparency information language and toolkit
(TILT) [9] to improve the transparency of information enforced
by GDPR, enabling a more automated use of such information
in modern information system engineering. The scalability of
the toolkit was not evaluated in cloud-based systems and its
comparison with other technologies such as a Blockchain was
not discussed.
Overall, addressing issues of privacy specifically in cloud-
hosted services raises a serious question about how cloud
providers need to handle personal (or sensitive) data that users
entrust upon them while accessing cloud services. Due to
the complexity of the cloud hosting process, cloud providers
may host data and services at different global locations.
Additionally, the user base can also be scattered across the
globe, eventually leading to loopholes due to different data
privacy regulations (at some locations, no regulations). Some
of the critical challenges and research questions related to the
use of GDPR legislation for cloud services include:
• How does a cloud provider understand what consti-
tutes“personal data”?
• How do we design a compliance-aware platform to host
cloud services? Compliance-aware implies that GDPR
legislation is automatically enforced across such a plat-
form, providing greater trust to a user that service access
and sharing of personal data will automatically preserve
their privacy.
• How can we identify and map data privacy regulations to
monitoring granularity (i.e. what should a cloud provider
monitor and at what frequency to support privacy audits)
while provisioning cloud services?
• How do we verify compliance in an automatic manner
and ensure the ’right to be informed’ obligation?
• How do we equip existing cloud platforms with a
monitoring strategy for logging information required for
verifying GDPR compliance? This monitoring should
not impede the performance of the service hosted by
the platform but still ensure compliance with privacy
legislation.
• How do we confirm GDPR compliance and provide a
trusted solution to securely log what personal data is
processed by which provider – especially where multiple
providers are involved in offering a particular service to
a user?
• What approach(es) ensures the translation of GDPR
obligations (e.g. data protection and data transfer) into
smart contracts and supports an automated verification
of GDPR obligations over the activities of providers?
Although, legal texts are often written in an open manner,
as aspect that is considered to be a highly desirable
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feature, as it leaves room for interpretation on a case by
case basis, such ambiguity poses challenges for automatic
compliance checking. Therefore, understanding how legal
concepts can be translated into a form that can be
automatically verified remains a challenge.
• The “right to be forgotten” requirement in GDPR can be
difficult to realise, as user data may be fragmented across
multiple services. How can cloud hosted services, which
may involve invocation and interaction across a number
of distributed platforms, ensure that this requirement can
be achieved and verified?
• How can we consider the preference of users for verifying
GDPR obligations (an essential requirement to ensure
scalability of the approach)? This approach assumes that
not all users care about privacy – or some users may have
greater preference of privacy across a subset of their data.
• Increasing use of mobile devices and their integration
with cloud platforms also poses scalability challenges for
automated GDPR compliance checking. The transaction
rate from devices can increase in frequency and complex-
ity. If a blockchain based approach is to employed, the
transaction rate of such a system needs to be scaled also.
The questions identified above describe key research chal-
lenges to assess GDPR compliance verification for cloud ser-
vices. Based on this context we have proposed a compliance-
aware multi-layered service stack – referred to as compliance-
aware cloud application engineering (COM-PACE) for cloud
services [10]. Fig. 1 shows the layered architecture comprising
of: cloud providers, virtualization platform, compliance check-
ing services & application layers. The compliance layer can
be used to enforce whether privacy requirements are being
supported for operations carried out within a conventional
cloud architecture.
• Compliance provisioning: In this step, user privacy re-
quirements to fulfill GDPR compliance requirements are
identified. Thereafter, any hardware resources that can
be used to instantiate trustworthy services (e.g. through
the use of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or other
hardware-based components) are configured with soft-
ware resources in a multi-stack web application environ-
ment.
• Compliance monitoring: A monitoring agent is activated
to track and extract events that have GDPR compliance
properties – and events are then forwarded to a blockchain
network. These logs can be used to evaluate and au-
dit GDPR regulations, and any possible violations that
may have occurred. A monitoring manager coordinates
between agents and the subsequent submission of log
records to the blockchain network.
• Compliance verification and enforcement: GDPR relevant
event logs submitted to the blockchain are verified for
compliance based on the use of smart contracts. This
verification helps to identify and disclose any possible
violation(s) concerning unlawful disclosure, processing or
transfer of personal data for purposes not agreed with the
Fig. 1: Compliance-aware multi-layered service stack for
Cloud services
user. A violation alert is triggered and can be visualized
providing transparent and trustworthy online services to
end-users.
A. Data Privacy Concerns under GDPR
Survey data consistently shows that people are concerned
with how companies use their personal data. For example, in
a survey published in August 2018 by the UK Information
Commissioner’s Office, 53% of British adults said they were
concerned about their ‘online activity being tracked’. Also,
the European consumer protection organisation (BEUC –
https://www.beuc.eu/) has reported that 70% of EU
consumers are worried about how their data is being collected
and processed. Similarly, in a study commissioned by IAB
Europe, 11,000 people across the EU were asked about their
attitudes towards online media and advertising, it was reported
that only ‘20% would be happy for their data to be shared with
third parties for advertising purposes.’ In the same vein, the
2019 Eurobarometer survey found that 30% of respondents
who provide personal data online feel they have no control
over it, and 51% stated feeling they have only partial control;
of these respondents 62% claimed that they are concerned
about this situation.
Concerns about data privacy are one of the main obstacles
to greater use of on-line services. Acknowledging this
reality, the GDPR was conceived and enacted to improve an
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individual’s ability to allow users to control their data and
give people ‘efficient and operational means to make sure they
are fully informed about what happens to their personal data’.
Beyond Europe, a number of other legislations also describes
similar requirements – such as the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), Australian Privacy
Principles (APPs) and New Zealand’s Privacy Act 1993 [11].
Consequently, the requirement for consent to be a valid
ground for data processing were strengthened. In particular,
consent must be given by ‘a clear affirmative act establishing a
freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication’
of an individual’s agreement to the processing of their
personal data’ – as described below:
Freely given and unambiguous: For consent to be freely
given and informed, it must be a separate action from the
activity the user is pursuing. Implicit or ‘opt-out’ consent
— continuing to use a website without active objection to
a notice — is not a clear positive action and consequently
does not meet the requisite legal standard to legitimise the
processing of personal data. Thus, pre-ticked boxes, which
require a positive action to opt-out from, are an explicit
example of invalid form of consent in the GDPR . Further,
“[a] consent mechanism that emphasises ‘agree’ or ‘allow’
over ‘reject’ or ‘block’ represents a non-compliant approach,
as the online service is influencing users towards the ‘accept’
option.” Similarly, cookie boxes without a ‘reject’ option,
or where it is located in a ‘more information’ section or on
a third-party web page, are also non-compliant . To enable
freedom of choice, both the accept and reject buttons must
‘be presented on an equal footing’.
Specific and informed: The consent of the data subject must
be given in relation to “one or more specific” purposes, and the
data subject must have a real choice in relation to each of them.
If the controller has conflated or bundled several purposes for
processing and has not attempted to seek separate consent for
each purpose, consent cannot be specific. Thus, when data
processing is performed in pursuit of several purposes, the
‘specific’ criterion can be met on the basis of granularity, that
is, the separation of these purposes, obtaining specific consent
for each purpose. Accordingly, an ‘accept all’ button is only
compliant if it is additional to the possibility of specifically
consenting to each purpose.
Moreover, to fulfil the ‘informed’ criterion, information on
the intended processing operations must be provided to data
subjects in advance. The provision of this information enables
data subjects to make informed decisions, understand what
they are agreeing to and exercise their right to withdraw
their consent. If the controller does not provide accessible
information, user control becomes illusory and consent be-
comes an invalid basis for processing. The GDPR legislation
sets out the information data controllers must provide to data
subjects when processing their personal data . In particular, all
‘recipients or categories of recipients’ of personal data must
be identified. If incomplete lists of recipients are provided
– e.g. a list of potential vendors in the context of real-time
bidding for advertising – this information will be insufficient
to elicit informed consent . Since both options to ‘accept’ and
‘reject’ consent must be at the same level, approaches that
force the user to navigate further to third party websites to
reject tracking by specific vendors is non-compliant.
In accordance with the accountability principle, data con-
trollers must be able to demonstrate that they comply with
their data protection obligations, including that they have valid
consent for each individual.
In practice, the above mentioned standards have failed to
translate into substantial improvements to individual control.
In order to secure broad access to personal data under the sem-
blance of GDPR compliance, website owners are increasingly
relying on ‘dark patterns’ – i.e. interface designs which seek
to nudge users into desired privacy-intrusive choices through
deceitful interaction flows. Examples of GDPR-non-compliant
dark patterns are intrusive default settings, the concealment
of privacy-friendly choices requiring extra effort from users
to choose them, and take-it-or-leave-it options which bun-
dle many data processing operations. Empirical research has
shown that many dark patterns on the Web are common,
and even widespread, such as the provision of a service on
the basis of implicit consent (i.e. no consent asked), making
the rejection of all tracking technologies substantially more
difficult than accepting them, and buried pre-ticked boxes
for optional vendors (e.g. third-party trackers) or purposes/
categories of data processing. Similarly, the fact that most web-
sites rely on advertising as their main revenue source coupled
with the complexity and multiplicity of actors involved in the
advertising actor chain results in numerous instances where
data processing by specific entities is not duly informed.
Importantly, consent is only one of the six legal grounds
that legitimise the processing of personal data, and controllers
typically rely on more than one, without specifying what basis
justifies the processing of specific data for a specific purpose.
This practice enables scenarios of unlawful processing and
causes a level of ambiguity which undermines a data subjects’
choices – e.g. a data subject may deny consent to the process-
ing of their browsing behaviour for targeted advertising, but
such data is nevertheless processed for that purpose on the
basis of the controller’s legitimate interests.
In the ongoing pandemic, which has forced us to increase
our reliance on digital technologies to conduct our lives
and endure restrictions, the above mentioned practices are
exacerbated, making the notion of individual control all the
more illusory. For example, imagine you want to have a meal
in your local restaurant (when restrictions are relaxed). Upon
entering the premises, you realise there is no ‘traditional’
customer service; rather, you need to download a booking and
payment app., entering personal details to register. However,
registration cannot be completed – and therefore you cannot be
served – until you tick a box signalling consent to terms and
conditions that allow for extensive processing of personal data
based on several legal basis, for multiple purposes unrelated
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to the transaction you had in mind (i.e. having a simple meal).
Any consent given as a result is invalid under the GDPR, as
the consent request involved no real choice. Yet, without the
competent Data Protection Authority (DPA) actually finding
and penalising the breach, consent obtained in this way is fair
game.
B. Apathy towards the GDPR: User Acceptance Survey
The practices above have translated into an overall apathy
towards the GDPR and the mechanisms through which GDPR
seeks to attain data usage agreement from an individual. For
the study we utilised a cross-sectional research design to
ensure the generalisability of the findings. We conducted a
survey to measure the importance of privacy protection as
afforded by the GDPR legislation. In total, 506 valid responses
were collected using an independent research company (Pro-
lific), which had distributed the survey online. To ensure
compliance with research ethics, the responses were collected
anonymously and following the consent of survey participants.
The survey contained two parts. The first part was aimed
at collecting socio-demographic data about the cohort for the
study. The respondents included 313 male (61.7%) and 195
female (38.3%) respondents, 82.6% were between 18 and 44
years old. 501 of the survey participants, accounting for 98.8%
of the total sample, had 10 or more years of experience of
using the Internet. More details of the demographic makeup
of the respondents can be found in III in the Appendix.
The second part was focused at measuring an individual’s
familiarity with the GDPR, and the extent to which users
perceived the GDPR legislation to be an important consid-
eration for privacy protection. The study adopted a validated
scale from prior literature [12] and tested the reliability of the
adopted scale (table 1). Given that the awareness is a latent
construct and cannot be measured directly, we used a multi-
item scale to assess it. The awareness of GDPR was measured
using a 7-point Likert style scale. The reliability of the scales
and the descriptive analysis of responses were assessed using
SPSS v27. The reliability (described in table 2) of GDPR
awareness scale was satisfactory, the factor loadings are above
0.4 and Cronbach’s alpha above 0.8 [13].
The results are summarised in tables 1-2 and figure 2.
In terms of GDPR awareness, 320 respondents (representing
63.2% of the sample) are aware of GDPR (Table 2 and figure
1). While the awareness is high this does not indicate that they
follow the rules and pay attention when companies breach
them. It can be seen that 52.8% (267) of respondents are
familiar with the GDPR, while 47.2% (239) of respondents
score low on this scale. In terms of importance, the majority
of individuals (286 respondents, 56.50% of the sample) believe
that GDPR is not important.
The finding that more than 50% of respondents did not
perceive GDPR to be relevant can be interpreted as a lack
of objective knowledge of GDPR benefits – and also aligns
with other work on user perception of the Computer Misuse
Act [14]. Another, assumption can be that individuals do not
trust the effectiveness of GDPR. This indicated that either
users feel that the GDPR is not likely to be fully complied
with by service providers or that the it is unlikely that the
Regulation will lead to prosecution.
The apathy towards the privacy protection provided by the
GDPR is problematic. If left unattended, it can culminate in
a ‘dysfunctional equilibrium’, in which controllers realise that
the level of individual control they offer is inconsequential
for driving demand, as users expect that they have no control
over their personal data to begin with. Thus, there is an urgent
need for new approaches aimed at making consent an effective
mechanism to signify and uphold our privacy choices, and
more generally at facilitating GDPR compliance by online
operators and law enforcement by Data Protection regulators.
III. GDPR COMPLIANCE CHECKING
In this section we describe a systems architecture that can
be used to support GDPR compliance checking. This includes
a container framework that can support automated GDPR
compliance verification using smart contracts. The realization
of our architecture contains a ratification phase that provides
an agreement between a user (data subject) and a provider
(data controller) before service delivery and any data usage.
A sequence diagram representing the protocol of this phase is
illustrated in Fig. 2. Through a smart contract, the purposes
of data processing which include “actor ID”, “operation”,
“personal data” and “usage aim” are sent into the blockchain
by the data controller. The data subject is then provided
with the deployment address of the contract, who is able
to retrieve and observe the specified purpose of data usage
from the blockchain and provide positive/ negative consent






record data processing purposes
run a smart contract
a:Data subject b:Data controller c:Blockchain
Fig. 2: A protocol for the ratification phase
Figure 3 shows the data flow between components support-
ing automated GDPR compliance verification. It presents all
the actions that are taken in the back end of our proposed
framework for tracking actors. First, users provide the cloud
container with their personal data. A cloud provider then re-
quests access to personal user data hosted within the container.
Based on these data requests, the activity of providers on user
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TABLE I: Awareness scale reliability
Items loadings Cronbach’s alpha
I follow news and developments about GDPR rules 0.899
0.902I discuss GDPR rules with friends and people around me 0.859I am interested in GDPR rules 0.865
I read about GDPR rules on web sites and magazines 0.893
TABLE II: GDPR Awareness, familiarity and importance
Category Frequency-Low Frequency-High
GDPR Awareness 186 (36.8%) 320 (63.2%)
Importance 286 (56.5%) 220 (43.5%)
Familiarity 239 (47.2%) 267 (52.8%)
data will be monitored and recorded by the container, and
recorded operations are sent to a blockchain network for the
purpose of verification. This step facilitates compliance with
the accountability principle described in GDPR. Each record
includes: an anonymised version of provider IP, the operation
(e.g., read, write, etc.) executed by provider on personal data,
and the processed personal data items by the provider. We
note that the actual value associated with personal data fields
is not submitted to the blockchain. After the execution of all
operations on user data during service execution, a trusted third
party, called a verifier, is able to run a transaction to retrieve
the block contents and flag any observed GDPR violations in
an automatic way. In particular, a smart contract is deployed
to identify the providers who carried out operations on a user’s
data without getting her positive consent, or that executed
a data processing operation in violation of the GDPR. An
example of such violation would be the collection of personal
data without the implementation of appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure the security of such data,











Fig. 3: Data flow in GDPR-compliance architecture
Based on the types of GDPR-relevant event being captured,
we consider a number of agents that support this capture [10].
These agents are deployed alongside container-hosted services
at each cloud service provider. The agents in charge of moni-
toring consider four key metrics related to GDPR compliance
verification: read, write, transfer, and profile operations. A
key challenge involves the selection of suitable compliance-
related events to be monitored across the entire topology
based on a trade-off between monitoring overhead, response
time, scalability and compliance coverage. Figure 4 shows
the data flow between different components that are used to
realise our system. A client agent GDPR agent is used to
submit an event record (read, write, transfer, profile) to a
recording/ monitoring environment. Details of the interaction
are extracted and added to the blockchain. Using encryption,
we ensure that no personal data is visible to non-trusted users
when the audit process is carried out.
A. Prior Work
In [10], [15] we have converted a number of GDPR opera-
tion requests into smart contract to verify their compliance by
cloud providers in an automatic manner. However, contrary
to machine-readable instructions that are concise, typically
involving binary ‘if/then’ type of language and therefore rigid,
legal rules tend to be ‘open-textured’, flexible and subject to
interpretation. This is particularly the case of provisions in
the GDPR, which feature terms like ‘appropriate’, ‘reason-
able’, ‘necessary’, ‘incompatible’ or ‘fairness’, to name a few,
that require highly-contextual interpretation and consequently
human intervention. Thus, we have been able to translate
into code only those rules that are strongly specified, whose
violation can be directly detected through logging, and admin-
istrable – i.e. rules having low representational complexity and
thus well-suited to be accurately represented in code. Given
the significant volume of transactions that a cloud provider
often needs to deal with, we believe this will significantly
strengthen privacy in the operations of cloud providers.
Our focus in this work is therefore on those aspects of
GDPR that apply to cloud service providers and which can be
measured based on operations carried out on personal data of
a user. Our approach also offers transparency and lawfulness,
as the data recorded in the blockchain can be used as a
basis for this. However, additional aspects of transparency are
limited by the type of logging supported by the cloud provider.
Data minimisation and the duration of storage, two additional
requirements of GDPR, can also be measured through the
blockchain submissions. Data integrity (i.e. the data is not
modified by the provider) can be indirectly (to an extent) inter-
preted by the write operations log recorded in the blockchain.
Similarly, the data protection smart contract verifies whether
or not personal data records are encrypted, a technique that in
and of itself ensures ‘integrity and confidentiality’.
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Fig. 4: Component interaction – showing how a GDPR agent can be deployed for each cloud service provider
Existing efforts have focused on developing a semantic
model (encodedb b with OWL/OWL2) for representing GDPR
rules, using a policy language [16]. This can be used to express
consent, business policies, and regulatory obligations, primar-
ily as a step towards the automated compliance verification
of GDPR obligations. The proposed policy language is also
contextualised with reference to other formal representation
of legal knowledge and reasoning, e.g. Legal RuleML [17].
Understanding how legal clauses can be mapped into au-
tomated rules remains a challenge however, and many of
the approaches that currently exist are often conceptual in
nature, leaving the more important consideration of automated
mapping up to the user. Conversely, where GDPR compliance
is attempted, the focus in on a questionnaire that needs to
be completed by a human expert [18] – with limited support
available to automate this process.
B. GDPR-Compliant Privacy Policy
As a GDPR requirement, a privacy policy should explicitly
describe the purpose for personal data usage by actor(s). For
example, in a cloud-based payment service, a policy can be
expressed as “provider accesses bank account details for mak-
ing an online payment”.The following definition determines a
privacy policy:
Let PS = 〈P, Pr,A, D,Dh〉 be a composite cloud service,
where P is a set of providers involving in the composite
service, Pr is a set of purposes of data processing determined
by P , A is a set of operations (e.g., access, store etc.) executed
by P on personal data, D is a set of personal data that will be
under processing by providers, and Dh ⊆ P ×A×D×Pr be
a data handling relation set that shows what operations will
be executed by which providers (actors) on what personal data
and for what purposes.
A privacy policy on Dh denoted by Pol(Dh) is a set
of statements: “pi executes α on d for pr”, for each
〈pi, α, d, pr〉 ∈ Dh, where pi ∈ P , α ∈ A, d ∈ D, and
pr ∈ Pr. It states that a privacy policy contains a number
of statements on data processing operations, each of which
must clearly expresses a data processing purpose. In case
a provider processes personal data without determining a
specific purpose, it is flagged as a violator of the purpose
limitation principle (Art. 5(1)(b) GDPR) and potentially of
Art. 6(1) when consent is the appropriate legal basis. Hence,
if there is a handling relation γ = 〈pi, α, d, pr〉 ∈ Dh such























Fig. 5: A part of a block containing “purpose” of data
processing
We have generated and recorded such privacy policy using
smart contracts and blockchain [15], [19]. Our implementation
improves the legibility of privacy policies in an electronic
format. Figure 5 represents an instance of a created block that
encompasses a blockchain ID for a provider executing access
operation on bank account data to support a payment process.
Based on such purposes retrieved from the blockchain, a user
can give positive or negative consent (for each purpose).
IV. IMPROVING USER ENGAGEMENT WITH GDPR
User disinterest in GDPR compliance that can be seen
from the survey presented in Section 2.2 is directly related
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to practices by providers of digital services. Such service
providers generally do not disclose particular operations that
are to be carried out on user data, especially when it relates
to data processing operations on personal user data.
User trust in a cloud provider can be improved by identi-
fying these data processing operations and the actors involved
in carrying out these operations. We believe this enhances
transparency – as required by Art. 5(1)(a) of GDPR. This
is achieved through the approach presented in Section 3.2.
The informative value of privacy policies is enhanced by
breaking down and explicitly identifying each purpose of data
processing. In turn, if individuals can identify the purposes of
the data processing operations, concerning specific items of
personal data relating to them, they gain the ability to make
informed decisions about their data privacy. Moreover, when
the visibility of data processing purposes is combined with the
ability to give or deny consent for each purpose, individual
control - one of the objectives of GDPR as acknowledged in
Recital 7 - is also attained.
Our architecture and implementation [20] enables messages
exchanged between the client app. and the cloud-hosted ser-
vice to also be explicitly identified. The use of a blockchain
enables operations carried out on user data to be recorded and
subsequently audited by an independent third party. Our pre-
vious efforts have focused on assessing scalability limitations
in using a blockchain network [15], primarily by modelling
the cost associated with carrying out such operations over a
blockchain. However by limiting the type of operation being
tracked (restricting this to read, write, transfer and profile)
we can improve scalability of the associated implementa-
tion. Other approaches that use a multi-layered blockchain/
parachain, can also be used to improve scalability.
V. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
GDPR remains an important requirement for many on-line
services which utilise user data. GDPR compliance verification
for a cloud provider is aimed to confirm that personal data
provided by a user is shared based on the requirements of this
legislation, so that any subsequent audit carried out on the
provider does not lead to a financial penalty. This verification
involves two aspects: (i) ensuring that user consent has been
obtained – in line with Art. 6 of GDPR; (ii) sharing of data
with external cloud providers is undertaken in a transparent
way, so that the user is aware of which providers the informa-
tion was shared with and for what purpose.
Our survey results show that users are ambivalent to GDPR
benefits, and often are not fully conversant with the actions
carried out by a cloud provider to achieve compliance with
GDPR. With increasing take up of on-line services for a
distributed workforce during Covid19, users often need to rely
on cloud-hosted service to carry out their work. Data privacy
needs have often been overlooked just to be able to access
such on-line services. With increasing use of mobile devices,
understanding how data privacy requirements can be extended
on such devices also remains an important challenge.
The proposed work offers a transparent, blockchain-based
auditing framework to ensure that GDPR compliance can be
verified [15]. We believe this provides a better mechanism
to improve take up and use of GDPR, and create better
understanding of how cloud service providers handle and
manage personal user data. The overhead of using a blockchain
implementation to record transactions carried out on user
data remains a challenge, addressed in this work by limiting
the types operations that should be recorded for subsequent
privacy audits.
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APPENDIX






Age 18 to 24 years 91 18
25 to 34 years 164 32.4
35 to 44 years 163 32.2
45 to 54 years 49 9.7
55 to 64 years 24 4.7
65 or above 15 3
Gender Male 313 61.7
Female 195 38.3




Bachelor’s degree 183 36.1
Master’s degree 64 12.6
Ph.D. 11 2.2
Other degree beyond a Mas-
ter’s degree
4 0.8
Income Less than £25,000 180 35.5
£25,000 to £34,999 115 22.7
£35,000 to £49,999 82 16.2
£50,000 to £74,999 61 12
£75,000 to £99,999 36 7.1
£100,000 to £149,999 17 3.4
£150,000 to £199,999 10 2
£200,000 or more 5 1
Marital Single (never married) 372 73.4






Internet Use – 1-5 years 1 0.2
No. of Years 5-10 years 4 0.8
10-15 years 70 13.8
15-20 years 214 42.2
More than 20 years 217 42.8
9
